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Too Big to FailWe use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the ﬁnancial
crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), ‘‘Too Big to Fail’’ (TBTF) banks, and ‘‘traditional’’ commercial banks.
Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks
in particular. We also ﬁnd that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample
sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively,
however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though
not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consis-
tently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of speciﬁc securities
(e.g., commercial paper) to address speciﬁc problems also appear to primarily beneﬁt traditional banks.
The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled
to discern what access to these programs meant.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 and 2008 in the US was caused by
the sudden realization of valuation issues in the subprime mort-
gage-backed securities market, but the crisis in the banking system
centered on the short-term debt markets. In particular, bank
ﬁnancing in recent years has been characterized by the funding
of long-term assets with short-term liabilities with the majority
of short-term ﬁnancing supplied by the repurchase agreement
(repo) market. From the second quarter of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter
of 2009, net repo ﬁnancing provided to US banks and broker-deal-
ers fell by about $1.3 trillion – more than half of its pre-crisis total
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Importantly, as Gorton and Metrick
(2012) report, a signiﬁcant portion of the collateral underlying
the repos was comprised of mortgage-backed securities.
Two additional prominent examples of the collapse in the
short-term debt market are: (1) the collapse of the Asset-BackedCommercial Paper (ABCP) market following the suspension of
redemptions by BNP Paribus1 from three of their money market
funds holding ABCP and (2) the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
caused by its inability to retain continued access to the short-term
debt market. With the ﬁnancial crisis centered on the short-term
debt markets, the Federal Reserve (Fed) took unprecedented actions,
largely through the creation of new programs, to intervene in an at-
tempt to establish stability. This paper examines the impact of the
Fed’s short-term bank liquidity programs on US bank stock returns.
In the attempt to provide access to short-term debt funding, the
Fed implemented a variety of crisis management programs. Banks
were given access to funds through several programs: increased
access to the Discount Window (DW), the Term Auction Facility
(TAF), the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF), and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF). Using a
dataset available from Bloomberg L.P. of individual bank’s borrow-
ing activity in the crisis programs; we analyze investors’ reaction
to banks accessing these crisis programs.
At ﬁrst glance, one might expect that access to additional short-
term credit through Fed programs during a crisis would increasethe third
erger of
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be viewed negatively by investors. For example, one of the four pri-
mary functions of the Federal Reserve is to be the lender of last re-
sort through access to the discount window. During the real estate
crisis of the mid-1970s through the early 1980s, some banks vis-
ited the discount window frequently. Repeated visits to the dis-
count window, while necessary and successful during this period,
came to be viewed negatively and progressed to the level of a per-
ceived stigma (Furﬁne (2003)), such that banks continue to this
day to avoid discount window borrowing.2 A second example of
the potential negative impact of participating in a crisis management
program comes from a large Texas bank participating in the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP).3 Once TARP participation was made pub-
lic, two competitors sponsored ads identifying the TARP participant
and asking if depositors want their funds in a TARP bank.4 Accord-
ingly, whether access to short-term credit under a Fed crisis program
enhances or reduces participant bank returns is an open and impor-
tant empirical question.
Veronesi and Zingales (2010) estimate that the (US Department
of Treasury Secretary Henry) Paulson plan for banks under TARP
announced on October 13, 2008 increased the value of bank ﬁnan-
cial claims by $130 billion through the reduction in the probability
of bankruptcy. This plan provided $125 billion in preferred equity
to the nine largest US commercial banks along with an increase in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) deposit insurance
limit and a three-year guarantee on all new unsecured bank debt.
Our analysis extends this line of inquiry by examining the impact
on bank stock returns of access to additional Federal Reserve crisis
facilities.
Using an E-GARCH model to estimate a market model on three
types of publicly traded banks: Investment banks (I-Banks), ‘‘Too Big
to Fail’’ banks (TBTF), and traditional commercial banks, we ﬁnd par-
ticipation in TAF was negative for all banks and for I-banks in par-
ticular. We also ﬁnd that the market view of the liquidity programs
changes across the sub-periods of our analysis. Speciﬁcally, I-Bank
and TBTF bank participation in the discount window in the ﬁrst
stage of the crisis (which is generally perceived as a liquidity crisis)
is initially viewed positively. As the crisis progressed and it became
increasingly apparent that liquidity programs would not solve the
market’s problems, continued use of the discount window and TAF
by the I-Banks and TBTF banks was generally (although not univer-
sally) viewed negatively. Second, CPFF program participation is
consistently positive for traditional banks, but not for I-Banks
and TBTF banks. Latter stage programs, such as CPFF which focus
on the purchase of speciﬁc securities (commercial paper) to ad-
dress speciﬁc problems generally appear to beneﬁt the traditional
banks more than larger TBTF and investment banks. This ﬁnding is
consistent with those of Gao and Yun (2012) who ﬁnd that CPFF
‘‘signiﬁcantly reduced the cost of debt ﬁnancing while having little
impact on the amount of CP borrowing.’’ The inconsistency of re-
sults across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market par-
ticipants struggle to discern what access to these programs
meant for the solvency of various types of ﬁnancial institutions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background
on the Fed crisis management facilities along with our2 The avoidance of this negative stigma is one reason the TAF program was created.
Armentier et al. (2011) use TAF data to empirically show the existence of the discount
window stigma.
3 TARP was originally envisioned to purchase troubled (toxic) assets from insolvent
banks. However, the program quickly moved to equity injections for banks. TARP is
not a lending program and therefore is not included the Bloomberg data on bank
borrowing.
4 The CEO of PlainsCapital Bank argued that the TARP funds were not taken as a
bailout, but rather was viewed as an opportunity. The competitors running the anti-
Tarp (and anti-PlainsCapital) ads and billboards were the Fort Worth based
Worthington National Bank and the First Financial Bank of Abilene.expectations of how markets will respond. Section 3 contains a
description of our sample and methods including the details of
our E-GARCH model. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics of
bank borrowings under the different Fed crisis programs. Section 5
reports the results of the estimations of the E-GARCH model on
bank stock returns. These results are presented separately for the
different time periods within the ﬁnancial crisis and the recession
that follows to include the conclusion of the various crisis manage-
ment programs. Section 6 concludes our paper.
2. Background on Federal Reserve crisis facilities
In this section, we identify and describe the Fed’s ﬁnancial crisis
facilities under which banks could access short-term credit. This is
not a complete list of Fed crisis programs, but rather addresses only
the facilities that provided for short-term debt to banks.5 In addi-
tion, we provide our expectations about the effect that each program
should have on bank returns. Our discussion covers the following
Fed crisis facilities:w
th DW5 More details
ww.federalrese
6 The Federal R
e announcemediscount window,
 TAF Term Auction Facility,
 AMLF Asset-backed commercial paper Money market
mutual fund Liquidity Facility,
 PDCF Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and
 CPFF Commercial Paper Funding Facility.The discount window (DW) facility has been in operation for
decades as a means of implementing the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort
function. However, the Fed made substantial policy changes during
the crisis to increase and expand access.
In 2003, discount window policy was modiﬁed to become a
standing facility with Primary credit operations for depository insti-
tutions in solid ﬁnancial condition and, Secondary credit operations
for depository institutions not eligible for primary credit. Before
the crisis, Primary credit was available at 100 basis points above
the target Federal funds rate. During the crisis, this spread was de-
creased on August 17, 2007 to 50 bps and decreased again on
March 16, 2008 to 25 bps. The second decrease to a 25 bps spread
was accompanied by a maturity increase from a maximum of
30 days to a maximum of 90 days. All discount window borrowing
is immediately available but must be supported by collateral, and
during the ﬁnancial crisis the Fed broadened the classes of accept-
able collateral to include any asset of sound ﬁnancial quality.
Adrian et al. (2009, Chart 4) show that discount window (pri-
mary credit) usage increased from approximately zero to roughly
$10 billion in April 2008 following the decrease to 25 bps. They
also show that discount window primary credit increased sharply
to about $100 billion following the Lehman bankruptcy and re-
mained above $40 billion through the end of 2009. We do not a
have an expected sign for bank returns relative to discount window
borrowing. The discount window provides funds to liquidity con-
strained banks so access could be viewed positively by markets
during a crisis, but the potential stigma attached to discount win-
dow borrowing could results in a negative response by from the
market.
TAF is the acronym for the Term Auction Facility. This program
provides short-term (28-day or 84-day) funds for depository insti-
tutions.6 The facility requires depository institutions to bid in a sin-
gle-price auction for collateralized term funds as an alternative to
accessing the discount window. The use of the bidding processon the Fed’s ﬁnancial crisis programs is available at: http://
rve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm.
eserve’s FAQ on TAF states: ‘‘28-day or 84-day term as speciﬁed in
nt may differ slightly to reﬂect holiday scheduling issues.’’
Fig. 1. Data Source: Bloomberg Financial Services.
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discount window borrowing (Cecchetti (2009, p. 66), Armentier
et al. (2011)). These loans were required to be over-collateralized
by at least a factor of two (i.e., a haircut of at least 50%) although
the Fed allowed a wide variety of illiquid collateral. The ﬁrst loan un-
der TAF was made in December 2007 and the last loan was executed
in March 2010. The program extended a total of $3.8 trillion with
$2.6 trillion at maturities of 28 days or less and $1.2 trillion with
maturities between 35 days and 85 days.7 The maximum in TAF
loans outstanding was about $266 billion in February and March
2009 as shown in Fig. 1. TAF was designed to infuse liquidity into
banks, so borrowing under this program would be seen by the mar-
ket as admission of serious structural problems and hence should
have a signiﬁcantly negative effect on bank returns.8
AMLF is the Asset-backed commercial paper Money market mu-
tual fund Liquidity Facility which provides loans to depository insti-
tutions and bank holding companies to purchase high-quality
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market mu-
tual funds. AMLF began in September 2008 and was closed in Feb-
ruary 2010.7 Footnote 3 states TAF will have terms of 28 or 84 days with slight adjustment for
holidays. The TAF data show other terms in days of: 13, 17, 35, 42, 70, 83, and 85.
Clearly, 83 days and 85 days are holiday accommodations. The other maturities are
outside the stated maturities. These maturities represent less than 6% of the loans
made under TAF.
8 Stigum (1990) states there are two situations in which the Fed can provide
emergency aid to banks. The ﬁrst is an act of God – ﬂoods, hurricanes etc. – which
adversely affects a group of banks, their borrowers or their depositors. The second, is
when in the judgement of the Fed, long-term ﬁnancing is needed to offset risk to the
banking system as a whole while a long-term solution is worked out. TAF is this latter
type of program.Duygan-Bump et al. (2013) ﬁnd that AMLF was effective in its
dual roles of (1) stabilizing MMF outﬂows and (2) improving ABCP
market liquidity. Akay et al. (2013) examine the AMLF program
and document a total of $217 billion in loans to seven depository
institutions resulting in 3249 purchases of ABCP from MMFs. Akay
et al. (2013) report that participants in this program had a ten-
dency to purchase ABCP for which they were the issuer, guarantor
or market maker. As a result, we expect the market to view partic-
ipation in this program negatively as a sign of ﬁnancial weakness.
PDCF is the Primary Dealer Credit Facility,9 an overnight loan
facility for primary dealers secured by collateral with appropriate
haircuts which was created to reduce the strain on the overnight
repo market. In effect, this program played the role of a dealer ‘‘dis-
count window’’ (Acharya et al. (2012)). PDCF began in March 2008
with loans reaching a maximum of $40 billion in the April following
the Bear Stearns collapse. The facility peaked at approximately $200
billion in loans outstanding following the bankruptcy of Lehman.
Loans under PDCF decline to zero in the second quarter of 2009
and the facility was closed in February 2010. Access to this program
would be indicative of ﬁnancial weakness and we hypothesize the
sign of this variable to be negative especially for I-Banks and TBTF
banks.
CPFF is the Commercial Paper Funding Facility and was some-
what unique in that the Fed created and funded a limited liability
company (SPV) with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as the
sole beneﬁciary of the new company. The vehicle purchased three-
month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper from eligi-
ble issuers. The CPFF began in October of 2008 and was closed in
February of 2010.9 For a more complete discussion of PDCF see Adrian et al. (2009).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of publicly traded US banks that participated in at least one Federal Reserve lending program from 8/1/2007 to 4/30/2010.
Variable Traditional Banks (N = 64) Too-big-to-fail Banks (N = 10) Investment Banks (N = 5)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Daily Returns 0.04%b,c 0.11%b,c 0.44%a 0.30%a 0.40%a 0.23%a
TAF Borrowings Outstanding (Millions $) 1330.0b,c 252.5b,c 12635.8a,c 9500.0a,c 63000.0a,b 63000.0a,b
Discount Window (DW) Borrowings (Millions $) 781.4 64.5b,c 1061.8 516.5a 2125.0 2475.0a
Primary Dealer (PDCF) Borrowings (Millions $) 4350.0 4350.0 46200.0 46200.0 26676.9 28851.5
CPFF Borrowings (Millions $) 0.9 0.0 8586.28 4460.6 6423.2 4328.6
AMLF Borrowings (Millions $) – – 26402.4 1009.7 24774.2 10960.0
Market Value 1694.35 384.48 33263.86 16800.69 80743.32 68705.11
TAF/MKTVAL 1.62 0.88 2.59 1.39 0.94 0.00
DW/MKTVAL 0.47b,c 0.09 0.03a 0.02 0.07a 0.01
PDCF/MKTVAL 0.02 0.00c 0.67 0.00c 0.84 0.60a,b
CPFF/MKTVAL 0.94 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.18 0.00
AMLF/MKTVAL – – 0.42 0.00 0.16 0.01
Avg. no. of days TAF borrowing outstanding 220.2c 207.0c 266.9c 317.0c 84.8a,b 0.0a,b
Avg. no. of days DW borrowing outstanding 38.6c 4.5 45.2 2.5 14.2a 18.0
Avg. no. of days PDCF borrowing outstanding 1.2c 0.0c 30.7c 0.0 202.0a,b 256.0a
Avg. no. of days CPFF borrowing outstanding 242.5b,c 237.0b,c 51.5a 0.0a 41.4a 60.0a
Avg. no. of days AMLF borrowing outstanding – – 48.7 0.0 87.6 102.0
MKTVAL is the average market value of the bank’s equity within the speciﬁc category of the sample. Term Auction Facility (TAF) was a substitute for the discount window; the
Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF) lending to primary dealers to create liquidity in Treasury markets and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility to provide overnight loans to
primary dealers are summed as PDCF; AMLF is the Asset-backed Commercial Paper liquidity facility for providing liquidity to money market funds; and CPFF is the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility to support high quality and asset-backed Commercial Paper. These programs were in addition to the Federal Reserve Discount Window
(DW). The data are from Bloomberg L.P. For two-tailed t-tests
a Signiﬁcantly different than traditional banks at 5% level or better.
b Signiﬁcantly different than too-big-to-fail banks at 5% level or better.
c Signiﬁcantly different than investment banks at 5% level or better.
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across the ﬁnancial crisis and include an analysis of the impact of
Fed crisis facilities on CP rates. They show that the CPFF program
was successful in reducing CP rates on three-month unsecured
and asset-backed commercial paper while the other facilities they
examine were not successful. We hypothesize that investors have a
negative view of the I-Banks and TBTF banks that participated in
CPFF since the large amounts borrowed by these banks reﬂects
an admission of ﬁnancial weakness in the face of the higher mar-
ket-determined rates.10 Accordingly, we anticipate signiﬁcant nega-
tive returns for the I-Banks and TBTF banks that relied most heavily
on this short-term funding source.
In general, there are two major competing hypotheses. First,
one would expect that the more directly a program addresses a
speciﬁc issue, the better it should work thereby generating positive
returns. However, as Acharya et al. (2012) point out, there may be a
stigma effect in accessing specially designed programs in that par-
ticipation might be considered by the markets as a sign of weak-
ness resulting in negative returns.113. Data and empirical method
3.1. Data description
The data for Federal Reserve lending under the crisis manage-
ment programs come from Bloomberg L.P. and comprise each
bank’s dollar amount by day for each program. We have Fed lend-
ing data from 8/1/2007 to 4/30/2010 and restrict our sample to
those banks which accessed one or more of the Fed programs dur-
ing the crisis period. The end date on the Fed lending data is not a
data collection restriction, but instead represents the end of lend-
ing to banks under the crisis programs. The equity return data are
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices.10 Of the $4.4 trillion of agency and government sponsored entity (GSE) backed
securities held by ﬁnancial institutions in the second quarter of 2007, $1.1 trillion was
held by banks.Table 1 provides details on the different loan facilities. We sep-
arate the sample into investment banks (I-Banks), banks named
too-big-to-fail (TBTF), and the banks that were not in either group,
which we term traditional banks. We categorize Bank of America,
Bank of New York-Mellon, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan-Chase, and
Morgan Stanley as Investment Banks based on the self-descriptions
of their business model. We categorize banks as too-big-to-fail
banks based on whether or not the Federal Reserve publicly an-
nounced their requirement to be ‘‘stress tested’’ in April 2009,
and they were not classiﬁed as Investment banks. The too-big-to-
fail banks are BB&T, Capital One, Citigroup, Fifth Third, Keycorp,
PNC Financial, Regions Bank, State Street Bank, Suntrust, US Ban-
corp, and Wells Fargo.11
These descriptive statistics provide prima facie evidence that
the different sectors of the banking community accessed different
Fed programs in differing amounts and for different lengths of time
and provides initial ex-post justiﬁcation for the development of
different programs designed to address different economic chal-
lenges. We discuss Table 1 in greater depth below.3.2. Empirical method
Our goal is to study the market reaction to the various short-
term Fed lending facilities to banks under the Fed crisis manage-
ment programs. The traditional approach, as discussed by Brown
andWarner (1985), estimates a market model using OLS. However,
there are several problems with using OLS regressions for event
studies, although they have been widely shown to work well on
average. In our study period, equity returns are highly volatile,
and this is especially true for bank stocks as the extent of the crisis
and effects are unknown throughout most of our sample period.Of the 19 institutions that are stress tested, American Express, GMAC, and MetLife
are removed from the sample since they are neither primarily banks nor investment
banks. We recognize that regulators stress tested many more banks than these, but
these are the ones initially reported to the public and such disclosure implies special
status.
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sibility of persistence in returns. The model we choose to handle
these effects is an Exponential General Auto-regressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (E-GARCH) model that accounts for time-vary-
ing variance as originally proposed by Engle (1982) and general-
ized by Bollerslev (1986) with the exponential addition as in
Nelson (1991). The E-GARCH equation allows for asymmetric treat-
ment of the prior error on this period’s variance.
The E-GARCH(1,5) model used is speciﬁed as:
Ri;t ¼ a1TRADBANK þ a2TBTF þ a3IBANK þ bRM;t
þ k1FINPREM þ k2VIX CLOSEþ k3QTRENDþ k4YEAREND
þþd1TAFSIZEþ d2 þ DWSIZEþ d3PDSIZEþ d4CPFFSIZE
þ d5AMLFSIZEþ c1IBTAF þ c2IBDW þ c3IBCPFF
þ c4IBAMLF þ c5TBTAF þ c6TBDW þ c7TBCPFF
þ c8TBAMLF þ
X5
k¼1
Returni;tk þ ei;t ð3Þ
We also use auto-regressive lagged returns (with ﬁve lags) to
account for persistence during this volatile period. The variance
is exponential to account for asymmetry and is speciﬁed as:
logðr2t Þ ¼ a0 þ a1 logðr2t1Þ þ a2gt1 ð4Þ
where gt ¼ absðet=rtÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2=p
p
 hðet=rtÞ:
The E-GARCH model thus provides econometric controls to im-
prove the estimation of the true variance to account for the large
swings in returns during the period. Our statistical tests indicate
that the E-GARCH model is well-suited to handle the econometric
problems in this volatile time period.12
We operationalize the variables as follows:1
in
re
pr
su
sta
en
ﬁt
go
m
E-
thRi,t2 The Durbin-Watson stat
dicating no auto-correlation
gressive (AR) terms are add
oblem, and the signiﬁcan
ccessfully handling the tim
ndard Q tests and LM test
tire sample period, and for
and the intuition of laggin
odness-of-ﬁt measures of M
odel’s R2 for GARCH(1,5) an
GARCH(1,5) model because
e GARCH(1,5) model. Resulthe daily stock return from CRSP
TRADBANK an indicator variable for traditional
banks that are neither too-big-to-fail nor
investment banksTBTF an indicator variable for the too-big-to-
fail banks that were stress tested by
federal regulators. Stress tested non-
banks are excluded and investment
banks are segregated into a separate
groupIBANK an indicator variable for investment
banks, and equals one for Goldman
Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New
York/Mellon, JP Morgan/Chase, and
Morgan Stanley, and zero otherwiseRM,t the equally-weighted stock return index
from CRSPFINPREM the difference between 30-day ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial commercial paper
rates in percentagesistics range from 1.52 to 1.71 for up to ﬁve lags,
, except in a few cases at the 10-percent level. The auto-
ed to minimize the effects of this marginal econometric
ce of the AR terms indicates these parameters are
e-series effects in the return-generating process. Both
s show ARCH disturbances for at least 12 lags for the
each of the sub-periods. Five lags were chosen based on
g for a period of one trading week. We examine the
ean Squared Error, Akaike Information Criteria, and the
d E-GARCH(1,5). Our choice is to report results from the
we believe it is the best ﬁt, but results are similar with
ts from the GARCH(1,5) are available upon request.VIX_CLOSE the closing value of the Chicago Board
Options Exchange Market Volatility
Index measuring the implied volatility of
S&P 500 index optionsQTREND an indicator variable for the last two
days of the quarter except for the fourth
quarterYEAREND an indicator for the last two trading days
of the year endTAFSIZE bank borrowings through the Term
Auction Facility (TAF) scaled by market
valueDWSIZE bank borrowings at the Discount
Window (DW) scaled by market valuePDSIZE bank borrowings through Primary
Dealer (PDCF) loans scaled by market
valueCPFFSIZE bank borrowings through the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF) scaled by market valueAMLFSIZE bank borrowings through the Asset-
backed Commercial Paper Loan Facility
(AMLF) scaled by market valueIBTAF, IBCPFF,
IBDW, IBAMLFinteraction terms between I-BANK and
TAFSIZE, CPFFSIZE, DWSIZE, and
AMLFSIZE respectivelyTBTAF, TBCPFF,
TBDW, TBAMLFinteraction terms between TBTF and
TAFSIZE, CPFFSIZE, DWSIZE, and
AMLFSIZE respectivelyThe AR terms are autoregressive parameters, and variances are
calculated using the Newey and West (1987) procedure.
Due to a large sample size, the correlations among some vari-
ables is statistically signiﬁcant, although very few are above a cor-
relation coefﬁcient of 50% (results available upon request). An
analysis using variance inﬂation factors (VIF) shows that none of
the variables is causing severe problems with multi-collinearity.
In addition, the variables are stationary which was determined
through a Phillips-Ouliaris cointegration test. In every case, the null
hypothesis of a unit root is strongly rejected at better than the 1%
level.
We constrain the coefﬁcients for the three category indicator
variables, TRADBANK, TBTF, and I-BANK, to sum to one. This
restriction allows the comparison each group to the average across
all groups since there is no group which may intuitively be omitted
as the comparison base case. The suppression of the intercept in
this speciﬁcation along with the restriction results in the interpre-
tation of the t-tests on these categories as the difference between
the group and the average bank being equal to zero. In addition,
we perform pairwise F-tests to check for differences between each
category.
4. Descriptive statistics of Fed borrowing by Banks
Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics for the sample. The
banks are divided into the three categories as we hypothesize that
the market will have different reactions to the support of the Fed
programs for too-big-to-fail banks versus traditional banks and
investment banks. We report means and medians on borrowings
in millions of dollars, and borrowings as a percent of market value.
The majority of the daily observations of bank borrowing across a
program are zero. Thus, to provide a sense of how each program is
used by banks in each category we use the maximum amount out-
standing under each program by each bank and provide the sum-
mary statistics by category for a program from these maximums.
The table also reports the average tenor of loans.
Table 2
Financial ratios for all publicly traded banks in the sample from 2008 Q1–2010 Q4.
Variable Traditional
Banks (Bank-
quarters = 704)
Too-Big-To-Fail
Banks (Bank-
quarters = 120)
Investment
Banks (Bank-
quarters = 52)
Mean Mean Mean
Return on Assets 0.23%b,c 0.44%c 0.60%a,b
Net Interest Margin 3.73%c 3.65%a,c 6.37%a,b
Equity-to-assets 9.77%b 10.16%a,c 9.34%b
Loans-to-assets 71.77%b,c 58.66%a,c 24.08%a,b
Loans-to-deposits 100.62%b,c 115.77%a,c 88.00%a,b
12-month GAP 18.06%b,c 20.79%a,c 25.46%a,b
Off-balance Sheet
Liabilities-to-assets
15.15%b,c 29.08%a 29.67%a
Past-due loans-to-assets 2.57%c 2.36%a,c 1.04%a,b
Quarterly growth rate 0.73% 2.33%a 2.36%
Total Assets ($000s) 15,954,115b,c 441,390,420a,c 1,267,251,525a,b
Income statement variables are annualized when the quarter is not at year end. 12-
month GAP is an interest rate risk measure calculated as the 12-month repricing
gap between assets and liabilities, scaled by assets. Past-due loans are those loans at
least 90 days past due. For two-tailed t-tests.
Note: We use 12 quarters of call report data to generate Table 2. At the top of each
column we provide the number of bank quarters of data used to generate the
information in the column. In no column do we have the total possible numbers of
observations. There are 64 traditional banks with a total possible number of
observation of 768 (62  12) but have only 704 bank quarters due to missing data.
Of the 11 TBTF banks, only Capital One did not participate in any of the ﬁnancial
crisis program reducing the TBTF column has 120 (10  12) bank quarters of data.
The ﬁve I-Banks provide for the possibility of 60 (5  12) bank quarters of data
however, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley did not convert to bank holding
companies until late 2008 and hence, we report only 52 bank quarters of data.
a Signiﬁcantly different than traditional banks at 5% level or better.
b Signiﬁcantly different than too-big-to-fail banks at 5% level or better.
c Signiﬁcantly different than investment banks at 5% level or better.
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ans indicate substantial skewness. The t-statistics andmedian loca-
tion tests indicate that traditional bank returns are signiﬁcantly
lower than both TBTF banks and I-Banks. The Term Auction Facility
(TAF) borrowings are signiﬁcantly different for all three groups, but
not signiﬁcantly different when measured as a percentage of the
average institutional market value. Discount window (DW) bor-
rowings are signiﬁcantly different for traditional banks than both
TBTF banks and I-Banks for the dollar amount borrowed (lower),
and on a percentage basis (higher). Primary Dealer (PDCF) borrow-
ings are larger as a percentage of the market value for I-Banks. The
average tenor of the loans is also different across classes. Invest-
ment banks borrow on a shorter-term basis than both traditional
and TBTF banks in the TAF program, but on a signiﬁcantly longer-
term basis in the Primary Dealer program. For those traditional
banks that borrow in the CPFF program, their average loan out-
standing is much smaller on a dollar value basis than TBTF banks
and I-Banks, but is much larger as a percent of the market value.
There are two important insights from Table 1 relative to the
division of the sample. First, traditional banks borrow in much
smaller dollar amounts than TBTF banks and I-Banks – this is to
be expected given the relative sizes of the institutions in each
group. However, using TAF as an example, the amounts borrowed
relative to market value are similar because traditional banks in
the sample are much smaller than TBTF banks and I-Banks. Because
the differences in dollar amounts and percentages are due to the
differences in the size of the banks in the groups, we use the per-
centage of the loan program compared to market value to account
for this size differential in our regression models. Second, usage of
the programs differs across the different sets of banks. Since TAF is
a substitute for discount window borrowing, the traditional banks
and the TBTF banks use TAF in excess of 200 days while I-Banks use
it for less than 100 days on average. PDCF is an overnight lending
facility for primary dealers; hence I-Banks use this facility for over
200 days while the traditional banks and TBTF banks use this pro-
gram for less than 30 days on average. This is a function of the
number of primary dealers in each category.
Table 2 presents the differences in ﬁnancial ratios for publicly
traded traditional banks, TBTF banks, and Investment banks.13 Note
that while there are 324 publicly-traded traditional banks with ade-
quate data to calculate the variables reported in Table 2, only 64
publicly-traded traditional banks borrowed from the Fed under
any of the crisis programs. Accordingly, we include only these 64 tra-
ditional banks in Table 2.
Investment banks have a statistically higher ROA than both
TBTF and traditional banks. ROA is negative on average over the
sample period for traditional banks and is 67 and 83 basis points
lower than TBTF banks and I-Banks, respectively. Some of the dif-
ference in ROA can be explained by net interest margin being much
higher for I-Banks and lowest for traditional banks which is a
reﬂection of their different business models. The equity-to-assets
ratio is highest for TBTF banks, in large part due to intervention
by regulators to increase capital for these banks that were stress
tested, and is lowest for I-Banks. There are other differences that
are more structural due to the nature of the different business
models, such as I-Banks having signiﬁcantly more assets and tradi-
tional banks making a higher proportion of loans and having less
interest rate risk as measured by 12-month GAP.14 We control for13 In a later section, we use only the quarter before the bank participated in one of
the loan programs.
14 GAP measures the difference between interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities.
Median statistics show the same general pattern and are not reported for the sake of
brevity. The most skewed variable is total assets with median assets for traditional
banks who borrowed from the Fed of $4,742,682, versus $168,216,344 for TBTF banks
and $910,095,000 for I-banks. The median asset size is statistically different across all
three groups, consistent with the means.these differences in a cross-sectional analysis, but since we have only
quarterly ﬁnancial statement data while stock returns are daily,
these variables are omitted in the remainder of the empirical
models.5. E-GARCH results
Previous research has reported several important events during
the ﬁnancial crisis that saw signiﬁcant shifts in the functioning of
the short-term debt markets.15 Therefore, we do not estimate a sin-
gle E-GARCH model over the entire period. Instead, we estimate the
model separately over the following sub-periods: (1) the BNP Pari-
bus (8/9/07) announcement through the Bear Stearns (3/14/08) fail-
ure, (2) Bear Stearns (3/14/08) through the Lehman (9/12/08)
bankruptcy, (3) Lehman (9/12/08) through the end of 2008, and
(4) from 1/3/09 through 12/31/10 which covers through the termi-
nation of all the Fed crisis facilities under analysis. These are well ac-
cepted breaks in the crisis timeline.165.1. BNP to bear stearns
The initial period of the ﬁnancial crisis from 8/9/2007 to 3/14/
2008 can be characterized as a time when investors began to
understand that problems existed, but had little idea of the extent
of the difﬁculties or the magnitude of the threat to the ﬁnancial
system. Table 3 contains the results for this period. Note that we15 A timeline of the ﬁnancial crisis developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis and is available at http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline.
16 We do not analyze these events speciﬁcally. Instead, we use the events as
reference points. While dozens of events may have inﬂuenced banks during the crisis,
these three appeared to signal major turning points in the market in general. Afonso
et al. (2009), Kapercyzk and Schnabl (2010) and Grifﬁths et al. (2011) all use similar
events in their analyses of the money market during the crisis.
Table 3
Regression results for effects of Federal Reserve lending to banks on returns for the
ﬁrst time period from BNP Paribus halting subprime fund redemptions on 8/9/2007
through the Bear Stearns failure 3/14/2008.
Variable Exponential GARCH(1,5) AR(5) Market Model
Estimate p-Value
TRADBANK 0.0305 0.3557
TBTF 0.1411** 0.0011
I-BANK 0.1106* 0.0419
RM 1.3105** <.0001
FINPREM 0.2788 0.4318
VIX_CLOSE 0.0022 0.4060
QTREND 0.4855* 0.0467
YEAREND 0.0421 0.9064
TAFSIZE 0.8203* 0.0299
DWSIZE 2.1056 0.1123
IBDW 104.9788** <.0001
TBTAF 0.4010 0.3078
TBDW 12.4741** <.0001
AR1 0.1021** <.0001
AR2 0.1346** <.0001
AR3 0.0977** <.0001
AR4 0.1457** <.0001
AR5 0.0625** <.0001
EARCH0 0.0113** <.0001
EARCH1 0.1020** <.0001
EARCH2 0.0493* 0.0255
EARCH3 0.1557** <.0001
EARCH4 0.0354 0.1616
EARCH5 0.1378** <.0001
EGARCH1 0.9950** <.0001
THETA 0.2763** <.0001
TRADBANK vs. TBTF F-stat. 7.42**
TRADBANK vs. I-BANK F-stat. 632.2**
TBTF vs. I-BANK F-stat. 322.26**
Adj. R-sq. 0.3690
The dependent variable is daily stock return from CRSP. TRADBANK is an indicator
variable for banks that are neither too-big-to-fail or investment banks; TBTF is an
indicator variable for the 19 Too-big-to-fail banks that were stress tested by federal
regulators; and I-BANK is an indicator for investment banks, consisting of Goldman
Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New York/Mellon, JP Morgan/Chase, and Morgan
Stanley. The coefﬁcients of TRADBANK + TBTF + I-BANK = 0 so that the groups are
compared to the average across all three groups. RM is the equally-weighted index
from CRSP. FINPREM is the difference between 30-day Financial and non-ﬁnancial
Commercial Paper rates in percentages. VIX_CLOSE is the closing value of the Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index measuring the implied vol-
atility of S&P 500 index options. QTREND is an indicator variable for the last two
days of the quarter except for the fourth quarter, and YEAREND is an indicator for
the last two trading days of the year end. TAFSIZE is bank borrowings through in the
Term Auction Facility, scaled by market value; DWSIZE is borrowings at the Dis-
count Window scaled by market value. IBDW is an interaction term between I-
BANK and DWSIZE. TBTFTAF and TBDW are interaction terms between TBTF and
TAFSIZE and DWSIZE respectively. AR terms are autoregressive parameters, and
variances are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) procedure. EARCH,
EGARCH, and THETA are variance terms for the exponential GARCH model. TRAD-
BANK vs. I-BANK/TBTF and TBTF vs. I-BANK are p-values from the F-tests for the
equality of coefﬁcients for the pairs of indicators for bank groups.
* Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
17 Note that at the end of the period, there were some very small PDCF borrowings.
We removed the PDSIZE variable from this regression since the coefﬁcient become
very large and affected the convergence of the model.
18 The ﬁrst mention of stress testing for banks was in May, 2007 when the FDIC
announced plans to stress test the largest 118 banks for possible FDIC premium
increases. Financial media reported the actual 19 banks in February, 2009. Actual
stress test results were ﬁrst reported May 7, 2009.
19 Rather, the government guaranteed $30 billion of Bear Stearns losses.
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ence points for the subsequent periods. Bank stock returns are pos-
itively related to general market movements (RM) and are
negatively related to calendar quarter-ends (QTREND). Controls
for ﬁnancial sector risk (FINPERM), market volatility (VIX_CLOSE)
and the year-end (YEAREND) are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Traditional banks’ returns are not different for the sample aver-
age (recall that the comparison is to the average since the coefﬁ-
cients of TRADBANK, TBTF and I-BANK are restricted to sum to
one). Investment banks have higher than average returns, while
TBTF banks have lower than average returns. The F-tests for differ-
ences across the categories shows signiﬁcant differences with TBTF
banks having the lowest returns, traditional banks in the middle,and I-Banks having the highest returns. However, we are interested
in bank stock returns relative to accessing Fed crisis programs, thus
we focus on the overall scaled variables for the programs (e.g., TAF-
SIZE) and the interactions between the bank category indicators
and program size variables. Since most of the programs were not
available this period, the model only includes TAFSIZE and DWSIZE
and the interaction terms for I-Banks and Discount Window bor-
rowing (IBDW), TBTF and TAF (TBTAF), and TBTF and Discount
Window borrowing (TBDW).17
The overall program variable for TAFSIZE shows that increased
borrowing using the TAF program is related to signiﬁcantly lower
stock returns. Overall, discount window borrowing does not have
a statistically signiﬁcant impact on returns. However, higher dis-
count window borrowing increases stock returns for both I-Banks
and TBTF banks as shown by the positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cients for IBDW and TBDW suggesting that, on average, access to
the discount window for large banks that did not yet have other
crisis related alternatives during this period was viewed positively.
Since this period is a baseline, it is important to note that the 19
too-big-to-fail banks had not been explicitly named at this point,
but we contend that the market was able to accurately infer which
banks were likely considered too big to fail.18 Similarly, Investment
banks had not yet converted to Financial Holding Companies and
were not subject to deposit insurance or bank regulation. Both Gold-
man Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted on September 21, 2008.
Due to the differences in these groups and the limited availability
of Fed lending programs at this time, this regression provides at best
a crude benchmark and should be interpreted with caution.
5.2. Bear Stearns to Lehman
The period from the bailout of Bear Stearns to the Lehman bank-
ruptcy covers 3/14/2008 through 9/12/2008. This period repre-
sents a period of growing concern about the crisis especially
given media reports on increasing instability, but a relatively calm
period for banks because Bear Stearns was not allowed to be dis-
solved under the Federal Bankruptcy Code.19 Table 4 presents the
regression results for this period.
The market index continues to be positively related to bank re-
turns. The other three market control variables FINPERM, VIX_-
CLOSE and QTREND are not statistically signiﬁcant. YEAREND is
omitted from the model for this sample period because the period
does not span a year-end. None of the dummy variables for average
returns is statistically signiﬁcant. However, the F-tests indicate
that traditional banks and TBTF banks have statistically similar re-
turns with both having statistically lower returns than I-Banks.
PDCF became active during this period. However, accessing
PDCF (PDSIZE) is not signiﬁcantly related to stock returns, nor is
there any difference for TBTF or I-Banks accessing the PDCF
program.
Discount window borrowing is also insigniﬁcantly related to re-
turns, while accessing TAF continues to be signiﬁcant and negative.
Estimates for I-Banks accessing the discount window and TAF are
both signiﬁcant and negative as indicated by the interaction terms
IBDW and IBTAF. TBTF banks accessing the discount window is sig-
niﬁcant and negative while accessing TAF is insigniﬁcant. These re-
sults suggest that during this period following the rescue of Bear
Stearns, investors saw discount window access and its liquidity
Table 4
Regression results for effects of Federal Reserve lending to banks on returns for the
second time period from the Bear Stearns failure 3/14/2008 to the Lehman Bros.
failure on 9/12/2008.
Variable Exponential GARCH(1,5) AR(5) Market Model
Estimate p-Value
TRADBANK 0.0030 0.9517
TBTF 0.0117 0.8912
I-BANK 0.0087 0.9356
RM 1.7665** <.0001
FINPREM 0.1170 0.8229
VIX_CLOSE 0.0050 0.5073
QTREND 0.3006 0.3317
TAFSIZE 0.6896** <.0001
DWSIZE 0.1147 0.6532
PDSIZE 0.3272 0.2456
IBTAF 4.1443** <.0001
IBDW 179.7220* 0.0199
IBPD 1.1912 0.4177
TBTAF 0.1387 0.6715
TBDW 3.0501** 0.0013
TBPD 1.6916 0.3216
AR1 0.0938** <.0001
AR2 0.1434** <.0001
AR3 0.1145** <.0001
AR4 0.1271** <.0001
AR5 0.0485** <.0001
EARCH0 0.0074** <.0001
EARCH1 0.0527** 0.0085
EARCH2 0.0349 0.2067
EARCH3 0.0156 0.5519
EARCH4 0.0650** 0.0097
EARCH5 0.0960** <.0001
EGARCH1 0.9984** <.0001
THETA 0.0470 0.2544
TRADBANK vs. TBTF F-stat. 0.01
TRADBANK vs. I-BANK F-stat. 312.61**
TBTF vs. I-Bank F-stat. 181.37**
Adj. R-sq. 0.3570
The dependent variable is daily stock return from CRSP. TRADBANK is an indicator
variable for banks that are neither too-big-to-fail or investment banks; TBTF is an
indicator variable for the 19 Too-big-to-fail banks that were stress tested by federal
regulators; and I-BANK is an indicator for investment banks, consisting of Goldman
Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New York/Mellon, JP Morgan/Chase, and Morgan
Stanley. RM is the equally-weighted index from CRSP. FINPREM is the difference
between 30-day Financial and non-ﬁnancial Commercial Paper rates in percentages.
VIX_CLOSE is the closing value of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market
Volatility Index measuring the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. QTREND
is an indicator variable for the last two days of the quarter except for the fourth
quarter, and YEAREND is an indicator for the last two trading days of the year end.
TAFSIZE is bank borrowings through in the Term Auction Facility, scaled by market
value; DWSIZE is borrowings at the Discount Window scaled by market value;
PDSIZE is bank borrowings through Primary Dealer loans, scaled by market value.
IBTAF and IBDW are interaction terms between I-BANK and TAFSIZE and DWSIZE
respectively. TBTAF and TBDW are interaction terms between TBTF and TAFSIZE
and DWSIZE respectively. AR terms are autoregressive parameters, and variances
are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) procedure. EARCH, EGARCH, and
THETA are variance terms for the exponential GARCH model. TRADBANK vs. I-
BANK/TBTF and TBTF vs. I-BANK are p-values from the F-tests for the equality of
coefﬁcients for the pairs of indicators for bank groups.
* Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 5
Regression results for effects of Federal Reserve lending to banks on returns for the
third time period from the Lehman Bros. failure on 9/12/2008 to the end of 2008.
Variable Exponential GARCH(1,5) AR(5) Market Model
Estimate p-Value
TRADBANK 0.2092 0.2293
TBTF 0.4445* 0.0477
I-BANK 0.6537* 0.0319
RM 1.1692** <.0001
FINPREM 0.3666 0.2415
VIX_CLOSE 0.0007 0.8768
QTREND 0.9244 0.5979
YEAREND 0.1041 0.8507
TAFSIZE 0.2442* 0.0158
DWSIZE 0.2707 0.6579
PDSIZE 2.5392** <.0001
CPFFSIZE 12.3627** <.0001
AMLFSIZE 4.3992* 0.0387
IBTAF 2.4636* 0.0201
IBDW 8.8788** <.0001
IBCPFF 9.6271* 0.0209
IBAMLF 0.0000 0.4184
TBTAF 0.2903 0.3249
TBCPFF 21.8865** <.0001
TBDW 0.0003* 0.0347
TBAMLF 0.2092 0.2293
AR1 0.0615** <.0001
AR2 0.1467** <.0001
AR3 0.0988** <.0001
AR4 0.0580** <.0001
AR5 0.0629** <.0001
EARCH0 0.0224** <.0001
EARCH1 0.0183 0.5097
EARCH2 0.1524** 0.0005
EARCH3 0.0300 0.4717
EARCH4 0.0121 0.7587
EARCH5 0.0020 0.9434
EGARCH1 0.9956** <.0001
THETA 0.0812 0.1143
Small vs. TBTF F-stat. 4.71*
Small vs. I-Bank F-stat. 50.36**
TBTF vs. I-Bank F-stat. 2.85
Adj. R-sq. 0.3642
The dependent variable is daily stock return from CRSP. TRADBANK is an indicator
variable for banks that are neither too-big-to-fail or investment banks; TBTF is an
indicator variable for the 19 Too-big-to-fail banks that were stress tested by federal
regulators; and I-BANK is an indicator for investment banks, consisting of Goldman
Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New York/Mellon, JP Morgan/Chase, and Morgan
Stanley. RM is the equally-weighted index from CRSP. FINPREM is the difference
between 30-day Financial and non-ﬁnancial Commercial Paper rates in percentages.
VIX_CLOSE is the closing value of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market
Volatility Index measuring the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. QTREND
is an indicator variable for the last two days of the quarter except for the fourth
quarter, and YEAREND is an indicator for the last two trading days of the year end.
TAFSIZE is bank borrowings through in the Term Auction Facility, scaled by market
value; DWSIZE is borrowings at the Discount Window scaled by market value;
PDSIZE is bank borrowings through Primary Dealer loans, scaled by market value.
CPFFSIZE is bank borrowings through the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, scaled
by market value. AMLFSIZE is bank borrowings through the Asset-backed Com-
mercial Paper Loan Facility. IBTAF, IBCPFF, and IBAMLF are interaction terms
between I-BANK and TAFSIZE, CPFFSIZE, and AMLFSIZE respectively. TBTAF, TBCPFF,
TBDW, and TBAMLF are interaction terms between TBTF and TAFSIZE, CPFFSIZE,
DWSIZE, and AMLFSIZE respectively. AR terms are autoregressive parameters, and
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I-Banks. Investors remain neutral on TBTF banks accessing TAF, but
switched their view of TBTF banks accessing the discount window
from positive (in the previous period) to negative. Clearly, contin-
ued liquidity problems for large banks were being viewed with
concern.variances are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) procedure. EARCH,
EGARCH, and THETA are variance terms for the exponential GARCH model. TRAD-
BANK vs. I-BANK/TBTF and TBTF vs. I-BANK are p-values from the F-tests for the
equality of coefﬁcients for the pairs of indicators for bank groups.
* Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.5.3. Lehman brothers failure
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers is generally viewed as the
signal that the US ﬁnancial markets were in a full-blown crisis. Thisperiod saw Congress pass TARP and the Fed take unprecedented
steps to address the crisis. We deﬁne this period as extending from
9/12/2008 through 12/31/2008. Table 5 reports the results of the
regressions.
Table 6
regression results for effects of Federal Reserve lending to banks on returns for the
post-crisis time period from 1/3/2009 through 12/31/2010.
Variable Exponential GARCH(1,5) AR(5) Market Model
Estimate p-Value
TRADBANK 0.0047 0.8893
TBTF 0.0503 0.3157
I-BANK 0.0550 0.3642
RM 1.5199** <.0001
FINPREM 2.6465** <.0001
VIX_CLOSE 0.0026** <.0001
QTREND 0.2357 0.2447
YEAREND 0.3867 0.2143
TAFSIZE 0.1252** <.0001
DWSIZE 0.0668 0.5469
PDSIZE 0.6425 0.0523
CPFFSIZE 0.5114 0.3731
AMLFSIZE 1.3398 0.3550
IBTAF 0.0575 0.8944
IBPD 1.7180 0.1525
IBCPFF 3.4903 0.1920
TBTAF 0.0062 0.9533
AR1 0.0706** <.0001
AR2 0.0861** <.0001
AR3 0.0642** <.0001
AR4 0.0608** <.0001
AR5 0.0574** <.0001
EARCH0 0.0163** <.0001
EARCH1 0.0519** <.0001
EARCH2 0.0520** 0.0002
EARCH3 0.0979** <.0001
EARCH4 0.0064 0.6311
EARCH5 0.0274** 0.0082
EGARCH1 0.9964** <.0001
THETA 0.1526** <.0001
Small vs. TBTF F-stat. 0.99
Small vs. I-Bank F-stat. 807.80**
TBTF vs. I-Bank F-stat. 512.35**
Adj. R-sq. 0.2972
The dependent variable is daily stock return from CRSP. TRADBANK is an indicator
variable for banks that are neither too-big-to-fail or investment banks; TBTF is an
indicator variable for the 19 Too-big-to-fail banks that were stress tested by federal
regulators; and I-BANK is an indicator for investment banks, consisting of Goldman
Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New York/Mellon, JP Morgan/Chase, and Morgan
Stanley. RM is the equally-weighted index from CRSP. FINPREM is the difference
between 30-day Financial and non-ﬁnancial Commercial Paper rates in percentages.
VIX_CLOSE is the closing value of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market
Volatility Index measuring the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. QTREND
is an indicator variable for the last two days of the quarter except for the fourth
quarter, and YEAREND is an indicator for the last two trading days of the year end.
TAFSIZE is bank borrowings through in the Term Auction Facility, scaled by market
value; DWSIZE is borrowings at the Discount Window scaled by market value;
PDSIZE is bank borrowings through Primary Dealer loans, scaled by market value.
CPFFSIZE is bank borrowings through the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, scaled
by market value. AMLFSIZE is bank borrowings through the Asset-backed Com-
mercial Paper Loan Facility. IBTAF, IBCPFF, and IBAMLF are interaction terms
between I-BANK and TAFSIZE, CPFFSIZE, and AMLFSIZE respectively. TBTAF, TBCPFF,
TBDW, and TBAMLF are interaction terms between TBTF and TAFSIZE, CPFFSIZE,
DWSIZE, and AMLFSIZE respectively. AR terms are autoregressive parameters, and
variances are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) procedure. EARCH,
EGARCH, and THETA are variance terms for the exponential GARCH model. TRAD-
BANK vs. I-BANK/TBTF and TBTF vs. I-BANK are p-values from the F-tests for the
equality of coefﬁcients for the pairs of indicators for bank groups.
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tistic is not different from zero) while TBTF bank returns are neg-
ative and I-Bank returns are positive. The F-tests conﬁrm
signiﬁcant differences with TBTF banks having the lowest returns,
traditional banks in the middle, and I-Banks the highest returns.
Banks’ returns continue to be signiﬁcantly positively related to
the general market index. The other market controls continue to
be statistically insigniﬁcant.
AMLF and CPFF are opened during this period.20 Accessing TAF
has a negative effect on returns as it has in all previous periods while
accessing the discount window continues to be statistically insignif-
icant as predicted. PDSIZE is signiﬁcant and negative which is differ-
ent from being statistically insigniﬁcant in the previous period.
AMLF is signiﬁcantly negative on average, while CPFF is signiﬁcantly
positive on average. The negative parameters for PDSIZE and AMLF
are consistent with the popular view that blamed the largest ﬁnan-
cial institutions with creating the crisis, while the positive parameter
on CPFF suggests that investors had a positive view of a program de-
signed to provide borrowers access to needed funds at lower than
current market rates.
The interaction terms provide interesting and important in-
sights because the programs to assist the commercial paper mar-
kets come online at this time. First, the liquidity programs
continue with mixed results. When I-Banks and TBTF banks access
general credit through the discount window (IBDW and TBDW) re-
turns are signiﬁcant and larger as shown by the positive coefﬁ-
cients. However, when I-Banks access TAF the impact on their
returns continues to be signiﬁcantly negative and the effect of TBTF
banks accessing TAF continues to be neutral. These results are gen-
erally consistent with our hypothesis on the market view of banks’
access to liquidity facilities. Second, the Fed started both AMLF and
CPFF during this period. AMLF was designed to purchase illiquid
ABCP from money market funds to provide liquidity to the funds
to meet redemptions. The interaction with both I-Banks and TBTF
banks is not signiﬁcant, which is not surprising since the program
focused in assisting money market mutual funds.21 CPFF was de-
signed to provide an alternative to the market for CP and ABCP issu-
ers during a period when these markets were viewed as constricted.
Both IBCPFF and TBCPFF are signiﬁcant and negative consistent with
our hypotheses. Figure 5 of Grifﬁths et al. (2011) show that the bor-
rowers under the CPFF program had difﬁculty accessing the market
at competitive rates.
Note that the model does not include interaction terms with the
PDCF program. Limited participation during this period by the
banks created severe econometric problems since a linear combi-
nation existed due to the lack of participation in the program by
some of the groups. We chose to omit those interaction terms
due to this econometric issue.
5.4. Post crisis recession
In 2009, the economy went into a general decline after the crisis
was blunted. The Fed continued their crisis facilities through the Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.20 The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) also opened during this period, but it is
not separated in our analysis because it is mostly used by I-banks and would create
econometric problems due to an extremely high correlation with PDCF and IBANK.
Where access to TSLF is indicated, we include the dollar amounts with PDCF, although
we later dropped these variables from the analysis. The focus of the Bloomberg data is
loans to ﬁnancial institutions under Fed crisis management programs. TSLF helps
primary dealers with liquidity, but is technically not a loan. Instead, it is a program
where primary dealers swap illiquid collateral with the Fed for liquid Treasury
securities that were then used to access liquidity through the repo market.
21 Akay et al. (2013) examine bank returns across the ﬁrst seven days of AMLF and
ﬁnd that JP Morgan and State Street earn signiﬁcantly positive returns. JP Morgan is in
the I-Bank sample while State Street is in the TBTF sample and the regression covers
the period from 9/12/08 through 12/31/08. Accordingly, our lack of signiﬁcance is not
surprising on the AMLF interaction parameters.early part of 2010, even though some were not actively used. For
example, AMLF continued to February 2010 but the last transaction
occurred in May of 2009. In this section, we complete our analysis
with the period from January 2009 through December 2010. Re-
sults are shown in Table 6.
Average conditional bank returns continue to be insigniﬁcant in
this period although the F-test suggests that I-banks performed
better than both TBTF banks and traditional banks. The market in-
dex remains signiﬁcant and positive. Further, the volatility proxy is
Table 7
Summary of results from Tables 3–6 for Fed program parameter estimates.
Dates 8/8/2007–
3/14/2008
3/14/2008–
9/12/2008
9/12/2008–
12/31/2009
1/3/2009–
12/31/2010
Variable Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6
TAFSIZE    
DWSIZE 0 0 0 0
PDSIZE 0  0
CPFFSIZE + 0
AMLFSIZE  0
Investment Banks (I-Bank)
IBTAF   0
IBDW +  +
IBPD 0 0
IBCPFF  0
IBAMLF 0
Too Big to Fail Banks
(TBTF banks)
TBTAF 0 0 0 0
TBDW +  +
TBPD 0
TBCPFF 
TBAMLF 0
The cells in this table are deﬁned as follows: () means that parameter estimate
from the original table is signiﬁcant and negative, (+) means that parameter esti-
mate from the original table is signiﬁcant and positive, (0) means that parameter
estimate from the original table is not different from zero, and a blank cell means
the variable was not included in the model report in the original table.
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cial rate spread is also signiﬁcantly negative for the ﬁrst time. Be-
cause a larger spread should hurt bank returns, this result is
suggestive of the markets exiting crisis mode. The quarter-end
and the year-end coefﬁcient estimates are insigniﬁcant.
The discount window variable is insigniﬁcant while the coefﬁ-
cient for the TAF program is signiﬁcant and negative. These results
are consistent across our analysis and suggest that the market
views discount window borrowing as normal, while it views TAF
as a form of crisis management with its corresponding negative
connotations. PDCF, AMLF and CPFF are all insigniﬁcant during this
period although all of these programs had signiﬁcant parameter
estimates in the previous period. The insigniﬁcant results here
are consistent with the economy exiting crisis mode.
During this period, the I-Banks participated in TAF, CPFF and
AMLF, but none of the interaction terms are signiﬁcant. This too
suggests a return to more normal market conditions. The TBTF
banks participated in DW, TAF, CPFF and AMLF.22 Using the TAF
facility for TBTF banks has an insigniﬁcant effect on returns. In gen-
eral, these results indicate a return to normalcy during this period
and are, at some level, an indication that the liquidity and capital
programs were successful in mitigating the crisis. However, we leave
the causality in this area to future research on the ﬁnancial crisis.6. Conclusion
The objective of this study is to examine the wealth effects for
banks relative to their participation in Federal Reserve ﬁnancial cri-
sis lending programs. We investigate stock returns for the Invest-
ment banks (I-Banks), too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, and
traditional banks through the period of the Fed crisis lending pro-
grams. Both univariate and regression analyses indicate that the
three groups have dramatically different characteristics and differ-
ing reactions to participation in Fed sponsored crisis liquidity
programs.22 The participation in these programs during this time was very small, and the
interaction terms for both IB and TBTF banks created large multi-collinearity
problems, thus they were dropped from the regressions.While traditional banks borrowed a signiﬁcantly higher per-
centage of funds at the Discount Window, their stock returns were
statistically indistinguishable from the average bank returns in our
sample during the crisis. One possible interpretation of this result
is that the Fed publicized that such borrowing would be viewed as
a sign of strength applied to this group of lenders. Both TBTF banks
and I-Banks also relied on the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and Pri-
mary Dealer program (PDCF) which substituted as the discount
window for these groups. Again, borrowing from the ‘quasi-dis-
count window’ was not viewed negatively for this group. Our mar-
ket model results provide additional insights. For ease in tracking
these insights the results are summarized in Table 7.
First, the market view of the liquidity programs appears to have
differentiated between normal and crisis liquidity programs. The
typical case is that programs were viewed differently depending
on the stage of the crisis. Discount window borrowing effects for
I-banks and TBTF banks changes from positive, to negative, and
back to positive (zero) across the ﬁrst three periods in our sample.
During the ﬁrst period of our sample, many believed that the econ-
omy was experiencing a liquidity crisis. Following the failure of
Bear Stearns, it became increasingly apparent that liquidity pro-
grams alone would not solve the market’s problems, and we con-
tend that at this stage market participants began to view the
access of specially designed Fed liquidity programs as conﬁrmation
that the ﬁnancial crisis was more serious than originally thought.
For example, in the second and third periods of the crisis (after
the Bear Stearns and Lehman failures) TAF borrowing by I-banks
had the hypothesized negative wealth effects, consistent with
our argument that access to such liquidity programs would be
viewed as a sign of ﬁnancial weakness.
Second, CPFF program participation is positive for traditional
banks, but negative for TBTF banks. This result is consistent with
our argument that CPFF participation by TBTF banks is seen as an
admission of structural weakness while participation by traditional
banks is seen as access to low cost funding (Gao and Yun (2012)).
This could be the case because traditional banks have fewer fund-
ing sources than TBTF banks, but causality of this market reaction
is beyond the scope of this study.
Finally, our F-test for differences in average returns across the
groups of banks showed that in each period I-Banks had the high-
est returns, and when traditional banks and TBTF banks had statis-
tical differences, the TBTF banks had lower returns. During the
height of the crisis following the Lehman bankruptcy, I-Bank par-
ticipation in the crisis programs of TAF and CPFF is viewed nega-
tively. Although TAF was designed to allow banks to avoid the
discount window stigma and CPFF was designed to help CP bor-
rowers that had difﬁculty accessing the short-term debt market,
both appear to have borne the stigma of indicating ﬁnancial weak-
ness. The effect on I-Banks accessing these specially designed crisis
programs while resulting in generally positive returns is consistent
with the oft-expressed view that Wall Street was being bailed out
at a cost to Main Street.References
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